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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Année : 2010

The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation

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Pierre Fleckinger
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Matthieu Glachant

Résumé

The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat the waste associated with its products. In line with reality, we assume that the producers either organize themselves individually or cooperate by setting up a producer responsibility organization (PRO). We study the various implementations of EPR. Central to the analysis is the trade-off between collusion through the PRO and market power in the waste industry.
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Dates et versions

hal-00446819 , version 1 (13-01-2010)

Identifiants

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Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant. The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2010, 59 (1), pp.57-66. ⟨10.1016/j.jeem.2009.06.002⟩. ⟨hal-00446819⟩
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