The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation

Pierre Fleckinger (1) , Matthieu Glachant (2)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3

The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat the waste associated with its products. In line with reality, we assume that the producers either organize themselves individually or cooperate by setting up a producer responsibility organization (PRO). We study the various implementations of EPR. Central to the analysis is the trade-off between collusion through the PRO and market power in the waste industry.

Mots clés: Extended producer responsibility; Waste policy; Product differentiation

Domaines: Sciences de l'Homme et Société; Economies et finances

Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant. The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2010, 59 (1), pp.57-66. ⟨10.1016/j.jeem.2009.06.002⟩. ⟨hal-00446819⟩