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Article dans une revue

The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation

Abstract : The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat the waste associated with its products. In line with reality, we assume that the producers either organize themselves individually or cooperate by setting up a producer responsibility organization (PRO). We study the various implementations of EPR. Central to the analysis is the trade-off between collusion through the PRO and market power in the waste industry.
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Article dans une revue
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https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00446819
Contributeur : Yann Ménière <>
Soumis le : mercredi 13 janvier 2010 - 15:23:12
Dernière modification le : jeudi 24 septembre 2020 - 16:58:02
Archivage à long terme le : : vendredi 18 juin 2010 - 00:48:37

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Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant. The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, 2010, 59 (1), pp.57-66. ⟨10.1016/j.jeem.2009.06.002⟩. ⟨hal-00446819⟩

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