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Autorité de gestion et avaries communes : pour un complément du droit de l'entreprise ?

Abstract : What can explain the prevalence of shareholders approaches in corporate governance despite their ever-growing critics? The article explores one possible explanation: the law, which is compatible with both shareholders and stakeholders approaches, gives managers great powers but without regulating neither their conditions nor their effects. Other cases show that historically the law has specified some rules to insure a managerial authority, such as the captain of a ship, to be both efficient and fair. Analysing the rules of "general averages", the article reveals how some rules are today mishandled in contemporary firms and how the law could support more collaborative governance.
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https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00643704
Contributor : Blanche Segrestin Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 22, 2011 - 4:02:34 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, September 24, 2020 - 5:00:03 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00643704, version 1

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Blanche Segrestin, Armand Hatchuel. Autorité de gestion et avaries communes : pour un complément du droit de l'entreprise ?. Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Association FCS, 2011, 4 (2), pp.9-36. ⟨hal-00643704⟩

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