Game theoretic contribution to horizontal cooperation in logistics

Xiaozhou Xu (1) , Shenle Pan (1) , Eric Ballot (1)

1 CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3

Horizontal cooperation in logistics was proved globally advantageous, but we see only few realizations until now. The main obstacle to the successful implementation of horizontal cooperation is the absence of appropriate cooperation decision making model, consisting of the detailed cooperation process, the optimization model, and the stable-and-fair gain sharing mechanism. In this paper, we propose a practical cooperation decision making model for the realization of horizontal logistics cooperation scheme. This model is a decision process integrating an optimization tool and a game-theoretic approach to find a feasible allocation rule, and stable coalitions related to coalition structures issue. We propose a weighted allocation rule that takes bargaining power, contribution and core stability into account, and generalize it in games with coalition structure. Then we investigate related stability issue under two different cooperation patterns. At the end, we present a case study of France retail supply network, which verifies the cooperation model we proposed.

Mots clés: Horizontal logistics cooperation; cooperation decision making model; cooperative game theory; weighted profit allocation; farsighted stability

Domaines: Recherche opérationnelle [math.OC]

Xiaozhou Xu, Shenle Pan, Eric Ballot. Game theoretic contribution to horizontal cooperation in logistics. 4th international conference on information systems, logistics and supply chain - ILS 2012, Aug 2012, Quebec, Canada. 10 p. ⟨hal-00733499⟩