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, The US case has followed a quite similar pattern according to various sources, 2005.

, It should be noted that elaborate credit mechanisms had not yet been developed at this point in history

, Similar ideas have been advanced by a number of commentators, 1967.

. Ripert, , 1951.

, This is consistent with the analysis of Blair and Stout who consider that the corporation is actually the residual owner of the surplus generated by team production, 1999.

, As Blair and Stout convincingly demonstrate, in order to be effective, the members of the team have to subordinate their inputs. The authors refer to a transfer of control rights: "both team members might improve their welfare by agreeing to give up control rights to a third party (?) to the actual productive activity, 1999.

, This model should therefore be regarded as a series of formal axioms describing collective action. Neither the nature nor the meaning of such action are presupposed. The model can, 2001.