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Entrepreneur’s Wealth vs. Firm’s Welfare: Exploring an “evergreen” governance for firm succession

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Kevin Levillain
Blanche Segrestin

Résumé

In successful privately held companies, where main shareholders and managers are strongly linked, the exit of a founder creates a dilemma between maximizing their wealth through external investment and perpetuating the organizational model by limiting external shareholders. Papers generally show that the entrepreneurs’ personal motivations are stronger factors, thus explaining the frequent transition of startups to public corporation models. But is there leeway to design different governance models, for example aiming to facilitate the firm’s transmission? Based on a case study of a french management consulting firm, we reveal a variety of parameters that can be at play when designing the ownership and management structure of such a company, and thus of the possible governance systems to be considered. Although the validity area of the case we exhibit is presumably limited, we contend that it opens a category of models that research could explore, strengthen and potentially contribute to diffuse.
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Dates et versions

hal-01292956 , version 1 (24-03-2016)

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Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification - CC BY 4.0

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  • HAL Id : hal-01292956 , version 1

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Kevin Levillain, Blanche Segrestin. Entrepreneur’s Wealth vs. Firm’s Welfare: Exploring an “evergreen” governance for firm succession. European Academy of Management Annual Conference, Jun 2016, Paris, France. ⟨hal-01292956⟩
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