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Article Dans Une Revue Economy and Society Année : 2017

Banking supervision and the politics of verification: the 2014 stress test in the European Banking Union

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Résumé

The statistical methodology known in financial terminology as ‘stress testing’ was used by the European Central Bank in 2014 in order to assess the solidity of the banks in the eurozone. This audit process is analysed here as a problem of truth production or ‘veridiction’ in the sense developed by Michel Foucault in his 1978–1979 lectures at the Collège de France. In order to prove effective, the stress test had to deliver knowledge on banks, objectified and actionable at once, but also controlled by the idea of avoiding ‘market panic’. This epistemological dilemma is at the core of the politics of verification, which consists in the distribution of restraint and responsibility between non-risky and risky banks. This qualitative investigation is focused on France and is based on interviews with relevant policy actors and documentary analysis.
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Dates et versions

hal-01679080 , version 1 (09-01-2018)

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Alexandre Violle. Banking supervision and the politics of verification: the 2014 stress test in the European Banking Union. Economy and Society, 2017, pp.1 - 20. ⟨10.1080/03085147.2017.1408216⟩. ⟨hal-01679080⟩
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