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Article Dans Une Revue Energy Policy Année : 2021

Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power

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hal-03519694 , version 1 (10-01-2022)

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Sven Heim, Georg Götz. Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power. Energy Policy, 2021, 155, pp.112308. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308⟩. ⟨hal-03519694⟩
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