Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power

Sven Heim; Georg Götz

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308

Journal articles

Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power

Sven Heim ^{1, 2, 3} Georg Götz ⁴

1 CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3

2 CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit

3 Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

4 University of Giessen Lung Center [Giessen, Germany]

Document type :

Journal articles

Domain :

Quantitative Finance [q-fin]

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Submitted on : Monday, January 10, 2022 - 3:58:04 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, January 12, 2022 - 3:15:34 AM

Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power

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Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power

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