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# A Foundational Framework for the Specification and Verification of Mechanism Design

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## Abstract

We introduce **mech.v**, an 6000-line open-source library of formally defined core mechanisms and concepts of **mechanism design** [1, 2]. It builds upon the widely-used **Coq proof assistant** and the Mathematical Components (MC) library to provides a strong infrastructure from which sound, formally **machine-verified** existing and new mechanisms can be developed, helping increase the confidence the services they offer are well-founded.

## Coq, a type-based proof assistant

Coq [3] is a mathematical proof checker based on a powerful **type theory** in which expressions  $e$  have types  $t$  that denote logical properties, written as type properties “ $e : t$ ”. For instance, one can express the infinitude of primes using the following type property, expressed as a lemma:

**Lemma** `prime_above` : forall m, exists p, m < p ∧ prime p.

To help proof developers construct expressions of a sought-after type, i.e., property, Coq uses an **interactive approach** based on typing rules and tactic languages. A large number of existing libraries such as Mathematical Components enable a **high level of abstraction** to be used for mathematical reasoning (e.g., the definition of *prime*, in MC).

## Bibliography

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## Contributions

1. **Reference.** The `mech.v` library includes the specifications and correctness theorems (e.g., truthfulness, rationality, or dominance) of well-known mechanisms and auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, the VCG auction for online ad or First Price and Second Price auctions.
2. **Assurance.** To benefit from the additional assurance that a mechanized proof brings compared to a pen-and-paper proof outline (an issue of increasing importance, given the exponential growth in the number of mathematical papers reviewed and published each year), we borrow a technique from the computer science literature, **proof by refinement**, to prove that the implementation of VCG for online ads auctions is a refinement of the VCG mechanism, thus transferring its general truthfulness property for (almost) free.
3. **Extension;** Since Coq proofs are simple syntactic objects, the agents participating in a mechanism can opt to trust a **reference proof checking implementation different** from our's to check for themselves that a particular strategy is, for instance, dominant, increasing their trust in the mechanism. In turn, this added confidence may allow the mechanism designer to use more complex design methods that remain truthful while providing better welfare for all.

## Example: VCG in mech.v

A direct Coq specification of the General VCG mechanism involving  $n$  agents, where  $O$  denotes the type of outcomes  $o$ ,  $A$ , the type of agents  $i$ , and  $\{ffun O \rightarrow nat\}$ , the type of functions from  $O$  to natural numbers (the bidding action of one agent), can be written as follows.

**Variable** ( $O : finType$ ) ( $o0 : O$ ) ( $i : A$ ).

**Definition** `bidding` := {ffun  $O \rightarrow nat$ }. (\* from outcomes to bids \*)

**Definition** `biddings` := n.-tuple bidding.

**Variable** ( $bs$ : biddings).

**Local Notation** "`bidding_j`" := (tnth  $bs$   $j$ ) (at level 10).

**Implicit Types** ( $o : O$ ) ( $bs : biddings$ ).

**Definition** `bidSum o` := \sum\_( $j < n$ ) ' bidding\_j o.

**Definition** `bidSum_i o` := \sum\_( $j < n \mid j \neq i$ ) ' bidding\_j o.

**Definition** `oStar` := [argmax\_( $o > o0$ ) (bidSum o)].

**Definition** `welfare_with_i` := bidSum\_i oStar.

**Definition** `welfare_without_i` := \max\_o bidSum\_i o.

**Definition** `price` := welfare\_without\_i – welfare\_with\_i.

This specification, close to its mathematical definition, can be used to see VCG as an instance,  $m$ , of a general mechanism, of type *mech.type*, as introduced in `mech.v` (see [1] for details).

**Definition** `m : mech.type n` :=  
mech.new (fun  $bs \Rightarrow$   
(map\_tuple (fun  $i \Rightarrow price$  o0  $i$   $bs$ ) (agent.agents  $n$ ),  
oStar o0  $bs$ )).

VCG's truthfulness theorem can then be specified and easily proven in Coq via the general definition, *truthful*, of truthfulness provided in `mech.v` (see [1]).

**Lemma** `truthful_General_VCG` : truthful p.

where  $p$ , the preferences, or profile, of each agent, of type *prefs.type*, specifies the true value strategy, current strategy and utility function for  $m$  (see [1]).

## Future Work

Improvements to the current setting may include:

- adding other notions related to deterministic mechanisms;
- tackling voting or probabilistic mechanisms [5], or
- making it an “executable” textbook for economy-education purposes, following the “literate programming” movement [4].